Single Question. Whether Hope is a Theological Virtue distinct from Faith and Charity

1. About the twenty sixth distinction I aska whether hope is a theological virtue distinct from faith and charity.

a.a [Interpolation] About the twenty sixth distinction, where the Master deals with hope, one question is asked, namely whether...

2. That it is not:

Because no passion is a virtue (Ethics 2.4.1105b28-29); but hope is a passion;   therefore etc     .

3. Again, no theological virtue determines a mean between two vices; but hope determines such a mean;     therefore it is not a theological virtue. The proof of the major is that, wherever there is a mean between two vices, excess and defect can exist there; but there can be no excess in tending toward God, as is plain in the other theological virtues; for a man cannot believe God too much nor love him too much. The proof of the minor is that hope determines a mean between presumption and despair as between two vices; therefore etc     .

4. Again, a theological virtue is in us only from God infusing it into us; but it is possible, without such infusion, to have hope with respect to the things for which the virtue is commonly posited; the proof is that it is possible, through acquired hope, to hope in the promise of a truthful man;     therefore much more is it possible, through acquired hope, to hope in the promise of God, who is most truthful.

5. Further, two things that are perfectible with respect to numerically one object are sufficiently perfected by two perfections; but in the soul there are only two powers perfectible with respect to the uncreated object, namely intellect and will; therefore etc     . Just as therefore the intellect is sufficiently perfected by one habit, which is faith in respect of this object, so the will is sufficiently perfected with respect to this object by a single habit, which is charity; and so there will be only two theological habits.

6. But if it be said that there are three parts to the image [of God], and that     therefore three perfective habits are needed with respect to these three parts - the objection against this is that two parts of the image belong to the intellect and only one to the will; therefore if three habits, according to this distinction, were required, two theological habits would be posited in the intellect and one in the will; but this is manifestly false, because hope is by some not set down as being an intellectual virtue or habit.

7. To the opposite:

I Corinthians 13.13, “Now remain faith, hope, charity; these three etc     .” therefore hope is a habit distinct from faith and charity.

I. Various Possible Solutions

A. First Way

1. Exposition of it

8. The foundation for this is the authority of the Apostle above cited [n.7], on which the saints rely when treating of this matter.

9. However if one were to contemn the authority [of the Apostle] and rest on the support of natural reason alone, then, since ‘a plurality is to be avoided where there is no necessity to posit it’ [Physics 1.4.188a17-18, 8.6.259a8-9], and since in the matter at issue there seems no necessity to posit a third theological virtue distinct from faith and charity, one would deny that hope is a distinct virtue.

10. The proof of the minor of this reasoning (according to supporters of it): The same will that is disposed to willing in ordered way is disposed to refusing or non-willing in ordered way. And the proof is that one cannot refuse something in ordered way unless there is a willing of the opposite of that something in ordered way. This is also confirmed by On the Soul 1.5.411a4-6, ‘The straight is judge of itself and of the curved.’ Also the same thing that is sufficiently disposed to loving a good when present is disposed to desiring a good when absent. And the proof comes from both reason and authority. By reason, because the same thing tends to a term that is not possessed by the same power as rests in it when it is possessed, as is plain of a heavy body. The authority is from Augustine On the Trinity 9.12 n.18, ‘the desire for something when one longs for it becomes love of the thing when one enjoys it’. Therefore if there is some habit whereby the will is disposed sufficiently for an ordered enjoying or willing of a present good, the same habit will suffice for every ordered willing, which will include ordered desiring and ordered not-willing of an absent good; but charity alone sufficiently disposes the will supernaturally to loving every present enjoyable object.

11. A second proof of the minor is that acquired friendship suffices for every ordered willing as to the loved thing - and this both as to the willing of desire and as to the willing that is love of the good when present, and also as to non-willing or refusing the opposite of what is loved; but infused friendship is no less sufficient for a multitude of objects than is acquired friendship, since the will extends itself widely to everything that can be loved by charity;     therefore etc     .a

a.a [Interpolation] Second, on the part of the intellect, because if hope were a habit it could not be placed in the intellect, because the act of the intellect in general is to understand; so all habits in the intellect will concern some act of understanding; but understanding with respect to a supernatural object is nothing but belief or faith.     Therefore etc     .

2. What should be Said about this Sort of Way.

12. If one holds this conclusion [n.9], one could say that hope in some way combines in itself two virtues, namely faith and charity; for the act of hope which is expectation [Lombard: ‘hope is the certain expectation of future blessedness’], includes certainty, and this certainty belongs to faith in the intellect, and it includes desire, which pertains to the will; and if so, meritorious desire pertains to charity, which perfects the will. Just as, then, perfect and meritorious expectation includes the certainty of the intellect and the desire of an ordered will, so hope, as a perfect virtue, would be said to include, by a certain combination, both faith and charity; and accordingly hope would not be posited as a third virtue simply but only formally, because it combines two virtualities in itself each of which is a perfect virtue, while hope is not, save formally by the formality of combination.

13. However the desire for what is not possessed can be present in the will without charity; also the whole act of hope, and even hope itself in itself, can be unformed, and so it agrees more with faith than with charity. Therefore it seems better to posit that hope, to the extent it is not a different virtue, agrees with faith, because a habit does not have a different form for universal and particular, as is clear in the case of all the intellectual habits; but faith regards the universal, because by faith I hold that ‘every finally just man is to be saved’, and hope regards the particular, because by hope I hold that ‘I as finally just am to be saved’; therefore the habit is not formally different in the two cases.

14. There is a confirmation, that someone who despairs is not said to hate but to be deceived; and therefore persuasion makes him love and desire, because he would very well desire it if he believed it was attainable by him.

15. Accordingly one would say that faith in all the revealed articles, to whomever the articles pertain and at whatever hour, is true and universal faith.This remark is perhaps to be understood of the parable of the workers in the vineyard, some of whom work the whole day, some lesser parts of the day according as they began at different hours. So true faith is to believe all the articles revealed at the time and in the condition anyone then finds himself in; and so some can have true faith if they believe fewer articles and others only if they believe more. ¹

16. Further too faith is rather in a way particular faith, because it is about revelations pertaining to him who has faith, and only about things pertaining to the future. Nor does this specification vary the habit, just as neither does it do so with other intellectual habits, but the habit is the same, and possesses a certain specification on the part of the object.

17. So no third habit or virtue is posited, but faith as to certain things, namely future things belonging to the believing person, is called hope, although faith does extend itself to the person believing and to other things.

18. But if it be said that futurity in the object varies and so distinguishes faith from the other virtues, there is objection against this:

20. First that the same habit is universal and particular, as is plain in all intellectual habits; so just as there is faith about ‘everyone finally just will be saved’, so there will be faith about ‘I, if I am finally just, will be saved’.

20. Second, that if futurity were the formal idea of an object, then hope would not be a theological virtue, for it would not concern something eternal as object but something temporal, for temporality would be the formal idea of the object.

21. Third, if futurity requires its own object, by parity of reasoning so would pastness, and so there will not be the same habit of faith about the past and the future.

22. Anyone who holds this way [of understanding hope] could say that, just as there are in the soul two powers, namely intellect and will, of a nature to attain God under the idea of object (and that by acts proper to those powers), so each power is sufficiently perfected by a single habit in respect of that object; and thus, just as the intellect is sufficiently perfected in respect of that object by the habit of faith, so the will likewise is sufficiently disposed in respect of the same object by the habit of charity, and the following statements about hope will be preserved: either that it is a third habit, including the other two by combination; or (which is more probable) that it is a certain particular faith respecting future goods to be attained by the person, and that to this extent it is distinguished from faith absolutely taken, which has regard to all persons generally and all articles of faith at any time whatever.

23. This way is not satisfactory, because it seems to oppose the authorities of the saints, which rely on the words of St. Paul (I Corinthians 13, nn.7-8).

B. Second Way and Consideration of it

24. It could be said in another way that, since it is possible to have excessive hope for a future good (as is plain in the presumptuous), and to have diminished hope (as is plain in the despairing), the passion that is hope for a future good needs moderating; and consequently the moderating habit, since it regards an eternal object that he who hopes is pursuing, it can be a theological habit and be called hope, because thereby is understood a habit that moderates the passion by which someone tends toward obtaining a future good; for anyone morally perfect needs habits with respect to the passions that are of a nature to exist in him too much or too little.

25. Against this there are objections:

First, that then hope would be an acquired moral virtue, not a theological and infused virtue, for a habit that moderates passions is a moral one.

26. Second, because then there would be an infused fear, but it would not be a theological virtue, for it does not regard the uncreated good object but only something bad, while a theological virtue regards the uncreated good.

C. Third Way, which is that of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of it

27. So in another way it is said that the distinction of hope from charity, though they perfect the same power, namely the will, is that hope is in the irascible part and charity in the concupiscible part, and that these parts are distinct not only in the sensitive appetite but also in the will.

28. The proof is fourfold:

First proof through the objects, as follows: the object of the concupiscible power is the good as pleasing, and the object of the irascible the good as hard: the pleasing good is what is desired by him who desires it because of its agreeability; the good as hard is something valuable or desirable for the sake of which the will desires to overcome all that is contrary. These two conditions, which do not belong to the same object under the same idea, belong to the good not only as it is conditioned here and now but belong to it simply; so they belong to the good not only as the good is an object of sense appetite (which is the good as it is here and now) but also as it is an object of will. Hence these two accidental conditions distinguish the irascible from the concupiscible not only in the sense appetite but also in the will.

29. Secondly, the same point is plain from acts, because ‘to be irate’ is an act of the irascible power alone; but it is possible to be irate not only through the passion that is in the sense appetite, but also through the passion that is in the will (Psalm 4.5, ‘Be angry and sin not’); therefore this act regards the will, and so it will be an irascible act.

30. The same point is proved, third, from comparison of diverse acts with each other; for when the concupiscible is resting in contemplation of something, the will sometimes also rises up to fight against the vices that impede contemplation, and this fighting impedes the contemplation. But no one and the same power has a per se act impeding itself in its own principal act; therefore the concupiscible power, which seeks to be delighted, does not oppose with an act of fighting what impedes it from its own delight; therefore it is another power.

31. The fourth is made clear through the diverse acts that belong to the irascible power in sense appetite, all which acts seem to be equally necessary in the will; therefore the same reason for positing the irascible power in the sense part is a reason for positing it in the will.

32. Added too is that “the concupiscible power is the principal power and the irascible is a certain force or energy in it.” “Just as all the passions of the irascible arise in the sense part from the passions of the concupiscible and terminate in them, so is it also in the will, since there too the irascible fights on behalf of the concupiscible.”

2. Rejection of it

33. Argument against this opinion.

And first against the first reasoning, which proceeds on the basis of the objects [n.28]. Since the point about ‘the difficult good’ can be understood well or badly, I ask what you mean by ‘difficult good’: whether an absent good, or not only absent but exceeding the faculty of the power for which it is said to be hard, or thirdly a valuable, that is desirable, good as it exceeds everything else that is contrary to it? If the first way then there will be no irascible power in the fatherland and consequently possession will not succeed to hope, for it would be necessary for possession to be in the same power as hope is if it is to succeed to it, and so it would have for object a difficult good that is absent, if this is how the word ‘difficult’ is to be understood - but this is false, for in the fatherland no desirable good will be absent. If in the second way then there would be no irascible power in God, for there is no object that is excessive for him; the consequent is false because if, in those who have hope, hope is a habit of the irascible part, then possession regards the same part; but it does not seem that God is to be denied possession with respect to himself. If in the third way, the object of hope is not rightly posited as ‘difficult’ in distinction from the object of charity, for charity most of all the virtues regards God under the idea of the valuable, because it regards him under the idea of the infinite good (On the Trinity 15.18).

34. Further, being valuable is understood of the object either actually or aptitudinally. If aptitudinally, because it is naturally apt to be thus valued, then this seems chiefly to belong to the object of charity, for - as was said [n.33] -charity most of all regards its object under the idea of infinite Good in itself. If actually, that is because the will does in fact thus value it, this valuing is badly assigned as the idea of the object of a power, for this actual valuing is because the will values the object in its act; so only this passive actual valuing is what is consequent in the act, but the formal idea of the object of any power necessarily naturally precedes the act of the power; but valuing cannot naturally be the idea of the object of a power or force.

35. Further, the act adequate to the irascible power is ‘to be irate’, just as the act adequate to the intellect is ‘to understand’; but being irate cannot have the difficult good for object, and cannot have it in any of the ways stated [n.33]. For according to the Philosopher in his Rhetoric 2.2.1378a31, ‘to be irate is to desire revenge or punishment’. This ‘desire’ takes for object either the punishment itself, or the one to be punished; neither is valuable; therefore the irascible power does not take the difficult good for object. - This argument disproves the second reason for the above position [n.29], for if ‘to be irate’ is an act of the irascible power [n.29], it follows that it is not distinguished from the concupiscible power by reason of a difficult good distinct from the pleasing good.

36. Against the third reason [n.30] the argument is that although what is of a nature to impede, through a positive act, the delight of any power must be subdued by some act that makes the power to enjoy in peace, yet what is not of a nature to impede save by way of privation does not need to be subdued positively but only privatively, namely by flight; now a vicious act does not positively attack the ordered delight of the concupiscible power, for the act that quasi-impedes the ordered act of the concupiscible power does not arise at the same time; therefore there is no need to subdue it save privatively, namely by fleeing it or preventing it happening. But fleeing the dishonorable belongs to that to which desiring the honorable belongs; therefore the concupiscible power is what subdues. - Besides, the concupiscible is posited as not fighting back or fighting for, because fighting back impedes delight [n.30], and yet later in the account it is said that the concupiscible power is defended by the irascible so that it is not perturbed in its delight; these two things seem to be opposites, namely that the power that does the fighting for impedes the concupiscible power and that it does not impede it but preserves it in its delight.

37. From this fact the fourth reason is refuted, which assigns these diverse acts to the irascible force [n.31]. It could also be argued that some of these acts do not belong to the irascible, at any rate in the sense part, which has no act about the future as future.

38. What is added in the first reason [n.28] - that the concupiscible power wants some good desired by the one desiring as advantageous for him - seems improbable, because the concupiscible is not denied existence in God as neither is the most perfect delight, and yet God does not desire anything as advantageous to him, because no other things are advantageous to him.

39. To this extent therefore, the doubt can be dismissed as to whether the irascible and concupiscible exist in the will (up to distinction 34, nn.48-50); and if they should be posited in the will, they seem to be posited because of the distinction between the moral virtues that perfect the will [d.34 n.51], and not because of the distinction between the theological virtues (namely hope and charity) as this opinion supposes [supra n.27].

40. Further, just as force presupposes power so object presupposes object; therefore the act of the force presupposes the act of the power about its object along with something added [infra nn. 90-99]; but such an addition is universally more noble (the point is evident in all acts that mutually add to each other); therefore if the irascible is the force and the concupiscible the power, the act of hope would be simply more noble than the act of charity, which is false.

3. What should be Said about the Rejection of the Third WayThis section is an extensive and somewhat fractured addition by Scotus to the basic text. ²

41. The first argument against Henry, about the arduous [nn.33-34], has a confirmation: if the excelling is a condition of the object of any supernatural virtue, then it specifies nothing; if the valuable is such a condition then it is so actually or habitually, so that the second argument is part of the first.

42. Again, the second argument of Henry, about being irate [n.29], is valid for a distinction of force, and it is not solved by saying that ‘to be irate is a certain not-wanting with respect to what impedes’ [n.35], and if the not-wanting is supreme (namely when it is known that what impedes cannot be removed), the sadness is supreme, and yet there is no anger.

43. I reply that just as wanting a thing for an end is not efficacious unless it follows knowledge about the possibility of attaining the end, so not-wanting an impediment is a sort of wanting the privation of a being relative to the end - nor is this not-wanting efficacious unless it follows knowledge of the possibility of attaining it; yet efficacious and non-efficacious wanting do not vary in species but only formally (as to the intention, perhaps, or as to the first knowledge of the possibility of attaining or not attaining).

44. On the contrary: he who is irate does not merely want (with an efficacious willing) the impediment to be removed but also wants the impediment to be punished, so that he does not rest in the ceasing of the impediment until the impediment is punished. The point is plain in the brutes: if what first impedes the delight of a withdraws, a does not rest until it exacts punishment; but if what impeded a was angry against some impediment, a was not angry, and then - when it withdraws - a does not pursue vengeance (namely crow with crow, crow with some third thing). As to what is supposed about ‘adequation’ [n.25], it seems false, because fear and hope are passions in the irascible; therefore not every passion in it is anger.

45. I reply that the first four passions [sadness, joy, hope, fear] can be about the delightful desirable and about an offense that needs to be avenged; these first four are in the concupiscible power and all others [love, desire, hatred, flight] in the irascible [Aquinas De Veritate q.26 a.5]. And just as the first four are about an object, namely the delightful, that is adequate to the concupiscible power, yet ‘to be apprehended in diverse ways’ is lacking in the present in the case of the future, so the four others are about an offense to be avenged that is apprehended as being now or as after having been avenged, but not as something to be angry against. So what is intended there [n.25] by the object is true.

46. However the premises given there for the adequate object [n.35] are not true. For although ‘to hope’ belongs in a way to anger, because it is a sort of efficacious will to avenge, yet ‘to fear failure to avenge’ is not a sort of anger, because it draws one away from avenging.

47. I reply that ‘to fear failure to avenge’ is a sort of ‘not-wanting not to avenge’, just as ‘to hope’ is a sort of ‘wanting to avenge’ and a certain pain in not getting it. Say that to be pained at this or that in the present is not formally to be irate but is a different passion, though consequent to anger, just as fear and excitement in the concupiscible are not formally to desire but they are different passions arising from the concupiscible. Therefore both forces or energies - both of the irascible and the concupiscible - do not get their names from an adequate passion but from the most principal passion. The point is plain about fear because when something hurtful is apprehended as future the concupiscible fears it, and from this pain [of fear] anger arises against what is bringing the harm, and command is given to subdue it; and in this way anger prevents the pain of a present harm and preserves one from it. But if the irascible is afraid to subdue it, supposing its fear is great, it does not subdue it, and pain arises because the harmful thing happens.

48. Similarly the first hope can exist without the second hope, if nothing is apprehended as impeding the object of the first hope.

49. Note: hope in the irascible lessens fear and pain in the concupiscible; but perfect fear in the irascible, or the pain of it, increases pain in the concupiscible. Hence there is supreme pain in the appetite when it is suffering a supreme present harm and despairs of being able to repel the harm.

50. Note to this [n.49]: the first part is perhaps true, the second false; for although an animal or the appetite feels perhaps more pain when it is pained in both forces, yet one diminishes the other since they are compossible.

51. The second arises from the first; an effect does not diminish the cause; therefore neither part is false when speaking properly as to the intensity of the forces - and both are true of the appetite as to extension.

52. Henry’s third reason is not well argued against above [n.36], because just as we fight in order to have peace, so the will fights against inordinate motions then arising in order that afterwards it may more agreeably and peaceably be at leisure for contemplation; therefore, at the time when the irascible is fighting, it impedes delight in the concupiscible, but the quiet that will follow is intensified. So Henry does not contradict himself when he says that it impedes the concupiscible from delight and that it fights in order to enjoy quietly (supply: afterwards, when victory is gained).

53. What the opinion of Henry says about power and force [n.31] is not well refuted [n.40] because it may be expounded thus: the concupiscible is more principle and the irascible less principle, because the latter is always about a being relative to the end in respect of the concupiscible; therefore the power gets its name (supply: of concupiscible rather than irascible) because of the principal part, though both belong to the same power.

54. On the contrary: then the power, as it is a power, cannot issue in an act immediately but only through one of its forces.

55. Again, not everything that has the concupiscible can do an act of the irascible but conversely; therefore the irascible is nobler according to the final argument [n.40] that rejects the opinion, because object adds to object as act adds to act.

56. My response here: where the irascible exists it does so because of the nobility of the concupiscible, whose being at rest nature was principally aiming at; where the irascible does not exist, nature does not care for it. The same about the resting of the concupiscible; that is why the argument [n.40] denied the irascible.

57. An argument for the opinion: hope is a passion in the irascible of the sense part; therefore hope is a virtue in the irascible of the will.

58. I reply: the consequence does not hold, because hope is passion as a sort of beginning of fortitude, which is in the irascible. Hope the virtue is for the act for which there is an efficacious desire of advantage, consequent to the apprehension of it, under the idea of reward for merit from someone, because ‘to desire’ means ‘to expect’; therefore it is in the concupiscible of the will. But that whereby the will subdues something is not hope, for it would not then have God for object, but the subduable; but the habit that corresponds to the second passion of hope is the virtue of fortitude.

59. On the contrary: every idea in the object, because of which the concupiscible is of a nature to draw back from what is desired, requires a perfection in the irascible fortifying the concupiscible so that it not draw back; of this sort is the excellence of the desired object and not just an impeding object; therefore perfection of the irascible is required because of the excellence of the object and not only because of something that offends.

60. The major is denied, because the adequate object of the irascible is what is to be avenged; therefore it is not the excellence of it.

61. To the contrary: the irascible is what per se strengthens the concupiscible; therefore it strengthens it in everything in which the concupiscible can fail and draw back.

62. I reply: the irascible is what per se strengthens as concerns the things that agree with fortitude (namely to confront and to withstand), but it does not fortify as to intrinsic degree; and therefore as to the defect that comes from drawing back from an excelling object, it comes from this; for because it is not raised higher, the object is excelling; therefore it is raised higher by an intrinsic habit so that it may be proportioned.

63. On the contrary: the concupiscible draws back from the hurtful because of its own imperfection, for if it were more perfect it would rise up;     therefore the irascible is not required in it.

64. I reply: the concupiscible - however perfect it is - can withdraw from the hurtful, and it would not rise up against but only flee the hurtful; to flee is not to repel; therefore etc     . But it would not have an excelling object above it in this respect, while the idea of the concupiscible stands in the object. And also it can desire in actual fact and, however much the act varies as to greater and lesser object, no other force is required but only perfection in the concupiscible. So it is in the case of the arduous, because the arduous, as arduous, is something to be desired; but a power, in order to be proportioned to the arduous so as to desire it perfectly (which is ‘to hope’), and so as to become proportioned by an intrinsic habit for overcoming impediments, embraces the whole objective idea in question as well as the acts that are operative about an impeding object. So by reason of this something else there is another force there.

65. Another response to the argument [n.59]: the major is true properly speaking about ‘draw back’, but it is never in fact so unless the reason for drawing back is something non-desirable; but the arduous is not such; rather the arduous has a special idea of being lovable; that which offends is something non-lovable.

66. The minor is false, although this proposition is true ‘a power tends of itself non-perfectly to the excelling’; for it is one thing to be disposed to tending perfectly toward it and another to drawing back; indeed drawing back presupposes an elevated power (as the cognitive power draws back from an ugly thing seen, and so hates it).

67. Again, it does not draw back by conditioned volition but by efficacious volition; but efficacious volition belongs to the same thing as conditioned willing does. Likewise no difference as to display of the possible and of the not possible is there required.

68. Again, if the irascible regards the arduous, since nothing is arduous for God, there is no irascible in him - which is false because he desires to avenge and does avenge.

69. Again if the irascible strengthens the concupiscible so that it not fear, then since it belongs to the same thing to be afraid and to be confident, the irascible makes the concupiscible confident. The consequent is false, both because confidence belongs only to the irascible and because a passion is not caused in the irascible by the concupiscible but conversely.

70. I reply that the concupiscible never fears because ‘to fear’ regards the arduous.

71. To the contrary: ‘to fear to lose’ is one thing, and ‘to fear to avenge offenses’ is another, because the first fear can be without the second. Example: let grace be apprehended as capable of being lost by the wayfarer; he fears to lose it; he does not then fear the devil taking it away, against whom he may be angry or fear to vanquish.

72. Again, from what passion of the concupiscible does anger against a future offense arise, namely against one about to take away the desirable? Surely from the fear of losing it?

73. Besides, some passion follows the apprehension of a future evil in the concupiscible, as pain follows the apprehension of a present evil. What is the passion that regards the future?

74. Again, pain and joy are in the irascible and, according to you [n.45], hope and fear. Why then cannot all the passions that concern the delightful be just like those that concern the arduous or offensive?

75. I reply: flight.

76. To the contrary: flight follows pain and the passion.

77. Nor is it a passion, because it does not come from the object.

78. If the irascible alone fears, then the concupiscible, if it were alone, would never draw back, because it does not draw back from the delightful as delightful; rather the delightful would thus not inhere as arduous, because it does not thus have any act about the arduous, because it is not its object; therefore the irascible is not required for strengthening the concupiscible.

79. I reply: the concupiscible draws back though it does not fear, because the arduous is proportioned to it in this way. And when it is said that it has no act about the arduous [n.78], I concede that it has none by way of tending toward it but does by way of drawing back from it.

80. Again, that the love of advantage and the love of justice are as it were two powers (and likewise about the irascible and concupiscible) is proved thus: that is not formally a power for any action with which, when possessed, an impossibility for that action can stand without repugnance, and this impossibility is an intrinsic one (‘intrinsic’ is added because of objections about impediments, [n.36]); but when the power or force for willing advantage is possessed, there can stand with it such an impossibility for willing what is just (likewise about desiring and being irate);     therefore etc     .

81. Proof of the minor [n.80]: the intellective appetite is, as such, a power for advantage; but along with it, as such, non-freedom stands without repugnance, for a prior can stand with the opposite of a posterior. These two things, ‘being an appetite’ and ‘being an appetite of such sort of cognitive power’, by nature precede the idea of freedom; and further, an impossibility for willing what is just stands along with what non-liberty stands along with. A confirmation: freedom is not the idea under which the intellective appetite per se desires known advantages, both because it would desire them even if it were without freedom, and because the will is naturally most prone to desire the greatest advantages; but freedom moderates this proneness so that we do not will immoderately; therefore freedom is not the idea in the will by which it desires advantage - on the contrary freedom is rather sometimes a sort of restraint.

82. All this is confirmed by Anselm De Casu Diaboli 12-16 about the will informed with love of advantage, if it were immoderately to desire advantageous things to be just it could not sin. If this separation of justice from the will were to involve a contradiction, Anselm’s position would be null not only in fact but also in understanding; nor could Anselm show what would belong to a will without freedom, because of the contradiction involved.

83. The minor about concupiscence and anger [n.80] is similarly proved, for whence does the appetite have its force of desiring? Not from the irascible unless it is posterior to the irascible;     therefore the prior stands with the opposite of the posterior [n.81].

84. This argument [nn.80-83] could be common to many things. Therefore I reply to the major, ‘that is not formally a power for any action with which, when possessed, etc     . [n.80]’; I concede it is not really a power, that is, the thing or nature is not a power. Then the minor [n.80] is false; and what is proved is only that a single idea is sufficient in itself for this and not for that, and so the idea can stand in the intellect with the opposite of the thing; but both are necessary in the one thing.

85. Note that second hope [nn.47-49] is a sort of beginning of fortitude, because things ‘naturally fitted for the mean’ are well adapted for regulating the passion and so for fortitude; second fear is a sort of beginning of the timidity of vice, hence someone naturally fitted for hope is naturally fitted for fear; for he who is naturally fitted for hope is disposed to audacity, and yet another to timidity. Second hope and fear are set down as concerned with avenging, which are passions of the irascible concerned with bearing up, since patience is a sort of fortitude and is in the irascible.

86. I reply: patience is constancy, and there is inconstancy.

87. If you say that no bearing up is disagreeable to the sense appetite save by command of reason -

88. On the contrary: a brute puts up with a moderate grief so as not to lose a great enjoyment.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

89. To the question then one must say that hope is a single theological virtue, distinct from faith and charity.

90. The fact is made convincing thus: we experience in ourselves the act ‘to desire that the infinite Good be good for us, and that by God conferring it on us freely - not indeed first but because of something ordered to it that is accepted by him, namely because of merits’; this act is good when with its due conditions; therefore there can be a virtue for it.

91. The assumption is plain from running through the circumstances:

The object indeed of the act is the infinite Good; the first circumstance is included in the word ‘desire’, which is an absolute willing, not of anything, but of something absent; God under the idea of an object perfectly to be possessed is absent from the wayfarer;     therefore a willing that tends to him under this idea has, on this point, its due circumstance.

92. Also the addition ‘to be good for us’ is a circumstance due to you, because the good is fitting for the one for whom it is desired as good; but no good sufficiently quietens the desirer save an infinite one.

93. The addition ‘by God conferring etc     .’ notes the due circumstance on the part of him from whom; for the good in question cannot be communicated save by God freely conferring it.

94. The addition ‘not first     etc .’ notes fitting disposition on the part of that by which the good is reached, because it notes a disposition that is fitting according to the way God orders the pursuing of the good; for divine wisdom has made disposition not to communicate itself perfectly to anyone save to one who is accepted beforehand for virtue.

95. Therefore      it is plain that the act is right, because it has its due circumstances; and so there can be a virtue inclining one to it, and this an appetitive virtue, because the act is an express act of appetite and the circumstances are the circumstances of an act of appetite.

96. This virtue is also a theological virtue. The proof is that it regards God as immediate object; for the idea of object as it is object is not taken away by any of the things that are added to the object [n.90]; for that I desire a thing for myself as being qualified by such or such does not take away the fact that I desire it as object - but what the act of desire is about is infinite, therefore it is also eternal; therefore it is a theological virtue.

97. But if it be said that desire involves absence of the thing desired, and so a condition of time in the object - it seems improbable, because hope and tending regard the object according to the same formal idea of it as object [n.19], just as there is the same formal idea of object insofar as there is a tending to it and a resting in it. But the difference is that the object is approached in diverse ways, because an absent thing that is imperfectly approached is desired but a present thing or thing that is perfectly approached is loved. Just as fire in the natural world causes, when approached, intense heat, but a distant fire or one approached less causes a cooler heat; but not for this reason is there less of the idea of being active in a distant fire than in a close one; just as the sun too, being more and less distant, causes direct and reflex rays.

98. From this one can argue in the issue at hand that, just as in the case of effective things what does not belong per se to the idea of being effective does not vary the idea of being effective, so in the case of ends what does not vary the idea of being an end does not vary the idea of end; such is how it is with being present or absent in the way said above [n.97];     therefore presence and absence do not vary the formality of the object.

99. There is also confirmation of this, that such absence or presence exists only as mediated through an act of intellect; for what is intuitively seen is present to the will as lovable, and what is seen as in a mirror is present to it as desirable; but the diverse way of an object’s being present to some power does not vary the formal idea of the object; therefore etc     .

100. If too it is said that ‘to desire the good for me’ varies the formal idea of the object, because it changes the honorable good into the useful good - this is false, for the condition or circumstance ‘for whom’ is not a per se condition of the object; rather such a condition can be added to the object while the formal idea of the object remains the same, as is plain in the case of faith: for in believing that God the Savior is the beatifier of all the good, I do not have an object formally other than God about whom I believe that he is three and one and all the other articles, but by the former I only compare the eternal to something temporal, and the comparison only states a respect of reason; and the same with ‘desire for me’, which only states a respect of the will, and on this respect I am now touching. Indeed every comparing power can compare its object to something else, and can cause a respect of reason in what is thus compared that is not present in it by the nature of the thing in itself but from the act of the comparing power; and so, just as reason, by comparing its object, can cause a respect of reason in it, so the will can, by comparing its object, cause some respect in it that can be called ‘a respect of appetite’. But such a respect is caused in a usable object by an act of use, when the will uses something; and such a respect can be said to be caused in God by an act of will, when I will the good ‘infinite in him’ to be good for me, because the appetite compares that good to another - namely to itself - by a certain comparison that is not in it from the nature of the thing.

101. But if it be objected that ‘therefore the will is evil when it hopes, because it uses what should be enjoyed, by referring it to something else’ - I reply that not every comparison of one object to another object made by the will is a comparison that is use, but only when the object is compared to another as to a lesser good ordered to something else as to a greater good to be attained through it; but it is not so in the issue at hand, but the will compares the greater good as abundant to a lesser good as what is to be perfected in it; and this is the comparison of liberality of which Avicenna speaks in his Metaphysics 6.5.

102. But if it be objected against this that to have the uncreated Good for object does not suffice for having a theological virtue, because then acquired faith and acquired charity would be theological virtues (for they have the same object as the faith and charity that are infused virtues, and have it under the same idea of object) - I reply that there are three conditions that are set down as belonging to a true theological virtue or to the first Truth. The first of these conditions is that it regard God as first object; second that it have for rule, that is, for first rule of its human acts, the first rule of truths or the first Truth, and not an acquired rule; third that it be immediately infused by God as by efficient cause. These three are distinct in that one is the idea of the object, the next the idea of the rule, the last the idea of the efficient cause. If all three are required for something’s being a theological virtue, it is plain that acquired faith and acquired charity are not theological virtues because they are defective in the third condition; by parity of reasoning neither is acquired hope a theological virtue, if the first condition alone is sufficient for it or the first along with the second. In that case acquired hope can be set down as a theological virtue from the fact it is immediately about God as object, by desiring this object for him who hopes; for even if he not hope that it will exist in him, yet he hopes for it (that is, he desires it) and not for something else for himself. But if the second condition for it to be a theological virtue is there as well, then he who has acquired hope relies immediately on the first Truth as the first rule of human acts or of our acts; for he does not desire it because acquired prudence tells him it is to be desired but because the first Truth supernaturally known shows him it is to be desired - and that is the first rule of our acts.

103. And if it be objected that, with respect to acquired hope, acquired faith is the rule and not the first Truth supernaturally known, one can reply that acquired faith is not the first rule in itself; and if it is not the first rule in itself nevertheless it regards the first rule. And so every virtue having it for first rule does not have natural prudence for rule but the first Truth - and if it does not have it in the idea of habit yet it has it in idea of the object that regulates the habit.

104. And if these two conditions do not suffice, one must say as a result that theology itself is not a theological habit; for it can be theology and not be immediately infused by God but acquired, and this both as to actual and habitual assent (which is acquired faith), and as to the apprehension that comes from teaching; and then one must tightly narrow down theological habit.

105. But if the first two conditions (about the object and the rule) do not suffice without the third (which is about the efficient cause), then one must concede that hope, although it require the first two conditions in order to be a theological habit (and to this extent a part of the proposed conclusion is obtained, in that it has the first two conditions), yet it gets completely to be a theological virtue from the third condition, namely from the fact that it is of a nature to be infused immediately by God. But if it is not infused, it is not had as perfectly as it is of a nature to be had by infusion; for the supreme part of reason, since it is subject immediately to God, is not most perfectly perfected by any created agent but immediately by God perfecting it. Now a habit that is of a nature to concern God immediately as object and to rely on him immediately as first rule is of a nature to perfect the first and supreme part of reason; therefore, although some habit could be had, yet not the most perfect one. And so, as was said above about faith [Lectura 3 d.23 nn.48-51], that although there is also an acquired faith, yet along with it another infused faith is necessarily posited (though the necessity of this infused faith cannot be proved by natural reason [Lectura ibid. nn.56-57]), one must speak in the same way about the matter in hand. And just as theological faith is preserved there because of the object and rule and aptitude to be infused (which are consequent to the superior part of reason), so is it argued here in the matter at hand as well, although some hope could be acquired as also could some faith.

106. The first conclusion, then, of the solution to the question is that, with respect to the act of hoping, there can be a theological virtue. To this I add that it cannot be faith or charity; therefore it is a third, distinct from them.

107. Proof of the minor [n.106]:

As to the part about faith, because every act of faith is a believing and no desiring is a believing.

108. As to the other part about charity, the proof is that charity is supreme affective virtue and consequently is supreme habitual love; but love of friendship is more perfect simply than love of concupiscence;     therefore charity simply inclines one to loving with love of friendship. But ‘to desire the infinite Good to be my good’ is not an act of friendship, nor is it the most noble act, because that object (the infinite Good) has a nobler being in itself than is the comparison of it to anything other than itself; therefore to desire something else, which is the first conclusion, is not the noblest theological act; therefore etc     .

109. This point about charity and desire is also proved because without such desire the act of charity can be most intense and can be weak and can be in the middle. The weak act is plain, for I can will that God in himself be good without desiring him for myself. The like is plain about the middle act. Proof of the supreme act is that God loves himself supremely, for he is supremely blessed in himself, and yet there is not included in this that God will himself to be good to another who loves him, nor need a freely acting power act necessarily as much as it can. These points are also proved by this, that it is not necessary for the will to have two acts in itself; but the act of loving God in himself and of desiring him for oneself as loving him are two acts; therefore one act can be without the other.

110. The point [that hope cannot be charity] can also be proved by the fact that in the will, according to Anselm, there are two affections, namely the affection of justice and the affection of advantage (he deals with them in Fall of the Devil 12, 14 and On Concord q.3.11). The affection of justice is nobler than the affection of advantage, understanding not only acquired and infused affection but also innate affection, which is congenital freedom, according to which the will can will some good that is not ordered to itself. But according to the affection of advantage it can will nothing save in order to itself - and it would have this if it was precisely intellective appetite following cognition without liberty, as sense appetite follows sense cognition. From this I wish to get only the following: since ‘to love something in itself’ is a freer act and more communicative than ‘to desire it for oneself’, and since the former act agrees more with the will insofar as it has at least the innate affection of justice, while the latter agrees with the will insofar as it has the affection of advantage, the consequence is that just as these affections are distinct in the will, so the habits inclining toward them will be distinct in the will. I say therefore that charity perfects the will insofar as it is affected by the affection of justice, and that hope perfects it insofar as it is affected by the affection of advantage; and so there will be two distinct virtues, not only because of the acts, which are ‘to love’ and ‘to desire’, but also because of what is susceptive of them, which is the will insofar as it has the affection of justice and of advantage.

111. The virtues will not be distinguished by the objects, which are the arduous and the delightful, as the preceding opinion said [n.28]; rather there is here altogether the same formal idea of object, although some things are added in one case and not in the other. Indeed ‘to be excelling’ states the condition that is ‘to be by whom’, but ‘to be absent’ states the removal of the object, which is a concomitant condition both in the efficient cause and in the end, and is not the formal idea of the object; ‘to want for me’ states the condition that is ‘for whom’, but ‘to will on the basis of merits’ states the condition how, as was expounded before [nn.90-95].

III. Objections

112. Against this way, which makes ‘to desire’ the act of hope [nn.89-90], there are multiple arguments.

The first is as follows: someone who despairs desires beatitude (and the proof is that he is saddened by the loss of beatitude); but no one is saddened save by the loss of something either loved or desired; he who despairs desires then, and does not hope;     therefore etc     .

113. Besides, I can love someone in himself with love of friendship and can desire the good for him; but I love no one in himself unless I wish good for him; therefore if any good intelligible in itself is loved with charity, a good is desired for him with charity; therefore in the same person a good present and absent is desired, from the authority of Augustine On the Trinity 11.12 n.18; therefore ‘to desire’ is not ‘to hope’.

114. Besides beatitude is naturally desired, as is plain from Augustine ibid. 13.5 n.8; so no supernatural virtue is needed for this.

115. Further, if hope is a virtue inclining one to desire, then ‘to desire’, which is the act of it, can be meritorious in the precise sense, since it is a theological virtue; but no act is meritorious unless elicited or commanded by charity; therefore ‘to desire’ will be elicited and commanded by charity. If it is elicited I have the conclusion intended, that hope will then be charity; if it is commanded, then charity commands as soon as hope elicits, and both are acts of the will for you [n.110]; therefore the will will have two acts at the same time about the same object, which seems unacceptable.

IV. Reply to the Objections

116. To the first [n.112] I say, as was said in 3 d.15 n.58, that conditioned willing suffices for sadness if the thing willed does not happen or if what is conditioned does not happen; but someone who despairs wills beatitude conditionally, that is he desires to attain it (if he could); and because his erring intellect shows it to him as impossible of attainment he is saddened. An example of this (touched on in the same place) is about him who, by absolute will, throws merchandise overboard into the sea during a storm; for if he absolutely did not will it, he would not throw it overboard since he is not compelled; yet because his will there not to throw overboard is conditioned (for he wills not to throw overboard if he could), therefore is he saddened when he throws overboard (for the condition because of which he wills to throw overboard is something simply not willed). So in the matter at issue, the man desires beatitude and wills it to be possible for him, but the condition (under which he wills it if he could) is shown to him in his intellect to be impossible; and so he is saddened by the opposite of the refused condition, and also by what is consequent to it.

117. So, to the form of the argument [n.112], I say that someone who despairs desires beatitude with conditioned desire, because he would will it if he could; but he does not desire absolutely because presupposed to ‘desiring absolutely’ is a conception of the intellect showing the desired thing as being possible for the desirer; for whatever is shown to the will as impossible is either not willed at all by the will or is weakly willed (according to Augustine On the Trinity). In this way what was said in 2 d.6 nn.9-13, 16 is perhaps true, that the angel wanted equality with God not absolutely (for he apprehended it as impossible for himself) but with a conditioned will, and in conditioned willing there is sufficiently found an idea of demerit or of sin as also of merit, and also -as is now being touched on - an idea of joy and sadness.

118. So some faith, acquired or infused, precedes an act of hope, to the extent that that only can be desired absolutely which is shown to be possible; and the possibility of obtaining the good is shown by faith applied to the delightful or desirable good. But the apprehension of the good as possible is not absolute desiring but only conditioned desiring, namely to the extent desire is in him; if however this desiring were without such apprehension and were conditioned, it would not be hope.

119. To the second [n.113] one must say that, just as charity has for first object God as he is in himself (for charity is the principle of tending to God as he is in himself), so too as regard any reflexive acts it is in a way a principle of tending to that object; for the principle of a direct act is the principle of all the reflexive acts tending to the ultimate end under the idea of ultimate end. Therefore, just as I love God in himself by charity so, by reflexivity, I love by charity that I love God in himself. So, however much reflexivity there is, I never have an object that is good as being advantageous for me but only what is supernaturally and finally good as being good in itself; but I will for myself that I love God as good in himself, and this act is perfectly meritorious in desiring beatitude, not as by desiring beatitude for myself but by desiring it as it is a perfect loving of God as God is in himself good.

120. I concede then that in the same way as I love some good, I desire good to what is loved - but not just any good, rather the advantageous good, which terminates principally in the good that I love in itself by charity; that is, that I desire for anyone loved that he love God because of God himself, that is, love him insofar as he is good in himself, and not insofar as he is good for this or that person.

121. To the third [n.114] I say that beatitude taken universally is desired by natural power with the affection for advantage, because - according to Anselm On Concord 3.12-13 - we cannot not will what is of advantage; but beatitude in particular is not sufficiently desired by natural power but by natural power and by acquired hope. Yet not even so is it most perfectly and sufficiently loved without infused hope and charity (in the way that was said of faith, that nothing is most perfectly assented to by acquired faith but by infused faith [Lectura 3 d23 nn.48-51]).

122. To the fourth [n.115] I concede that a meritoriously desiring will has two acts: an act of hoping elicited properly by hope and commanded by charity, and another elicited by charity. Nor is it unacceptable that, in the case of subordinate acts, there be several in the same thing at the same time; indeed it is perhaps necessary that he who knows a conclusion of science - when he is actually contemplating it - scientifically understand the principle; and necessary that he who loves in ordered way what is for the end use what is for the end and at the same time be enjoying the end.a

a.a [Interpolation, in reply to the objection in n.115] That ‘to hope’ is ‘to desire’ rather than ‘to believe’ is clear, because ‘to be sad’ is rather ‘to desire’ than it is ‘to believe’.

     Again, there is one faith of the Good in itself and of the good in us, so things are the same in the will. This can be argued as follows: if every ‘to believe’ comes from a single habit, why is not every ‘to will’ likewise from one habit?

     Further, what is loved presupposes love of that for whom it is loved; therefore hope presupposes charity.

V. To the Arguments for the First Way

123. To the arguments for the first way, which seem to follow natural reason [n.9], it can be replied that here a plurality is necessary.

124. To the first proof [n.10] it is plain from what was said [n.100] that to desire for this while standing on that cannot be formally an act belonging to the same virtue as the act of willing what is ordered in itself belongs to; although to desire this thing for that person, so that the latter tend to the former as it is good in itself, is an act of the same virtue.

125. As to what is added about acquired friendship [n.11], it could be said that acquired friendship has different habits.

126. As to what is added about the certitude of hope and the certitude of the one who hopes [n.12] my reply is that they precede the act of hope and despair. For no one effectively and absolutely hopes for or desires anything save what can be attained by him. And one who despairs does not desire absolutely; and the reason is that he does not believe it is possible for him to attain it, and so persuasion is given to make him believe and not to make him love, because the first root of this error is not in the will (for when the will does not efficaciously desire something, it is because the intellect does not efficaciously show the thing as something to be desired).

127. The same point makes plain the argument about universal and particular [n.19], that to believe ‘I as just am to be finally saved’ is only faith applied to some particular; but to desire it is an act of hope.

128. But then the objection is made: therefore ‘to desire a good of the same idea for one’s neighbor’ will be an act of hope; indeed (what is more) ‘to will a present good of the same idea to blessed Peter’ will be an act of hope -which is absurd.

129. Seek an answer.a

a.a [Interpolation] Note that this reply, which Scotus does not solve, is solved by the definition of the act of hope, that it is said to be ‘to desire’; by which is solved the second reply, for the understanding is that it is not present but absent; and so it is not called hope if it is about the present.

     It was also posited that ‘to desire the infinite Good’ is in me from God [nn.91-92]. And by the ‘in me’, which is the circumstance ‘for whom’ [n.100], is solved the first reply and the whole argument, because hope is not in desiring a good for another, which is rather charity or acquired love. But see Scotus’ intention expressly below, d.31 nn.19-20.

VI. To the Principal Arguments

130. To the first principal argument [n.2] I say that names are conventional. Hence ‘hope’ can be and was imposed to signify a certain passion impressed on the sense appetite by some delightful thing that is present not in itself but in imagination (for if it were present in itself it would be of a nature to impress delight, just as, on the other side, an evil present in imagination is of a nature to impress fear, and an evil present in itself impresses pain). And I concede that in this way hope is not a virtue, either moral or theological; yet the same name can signify the aforesaid habit [n.90], whose property it is to tend to the sort of object that is ‘desire that the infinite Good be good for me from God freely conferring it because of the merits that I have or that I hope for myself.’

131. To the second [n.3], although it be said that the mean does not participate the extremes but unites them, yet one can concede that a theological virtue is properly a mean, not on the part of the object, but on the part of the excess that can exist in the act. A moral virtue, by contrast, has excess and defect not only by reason of the mode of the action but also by reason of the act as it tends to the object. A theological virtue is not so because the object to which it tends is infinite; yet an immoderate act (here greater, there lesser) can tend toward it, and the virtue moderates it so that it tends toward it in a middle way. And one can in this way concede that faith is a certain mean or middle between levity, whereby someone assents too easily to what is not to be believed (according to the saying ‘who believes too quickly is shallow of heart’, Ecclesiasticus 19.4), and stubbornness, whereby someone resists what is to be believed, refusing to assent to anything unless it be made evident by natural reason. Thus also can one tend with too much and with too little love to some lovable object, but one cannot, when tending to God, tend to an object that is too good or too true. Now moral temperance requires the mean in both ways, because it can tend to an excessive or a deficient object and with a deficient or excessive act; the second way is common to moral and theological virtue, and the first is not.

132. The answer to the third argument [n.4] is plain from what was said in the question on faith [Lectura 3 d.23 nn.48, 56-57], and also from what was said in this question [n.105]; because it cannot be proved by natural reason that there is some infused virtue, for the acts that we experience in ourselves can perhaps be equally perfectly present and be equally perfectly of the same idea even on the supposition that there is no infused virtue; but, believing that there is some infused virtue, the acts are not bound to be as perfect as in the infused virtue; therefore although by acquired faith one could hope for the things promised by God (just as one can believe by acquired faith), yet there is another hope of a nature to be an infused virtue, which perfects the higher part of the will in its desiring the infinite good for itself; and once this infused virtue is possessed, the will desires the good more perfectly than without it, just as it is held that there is some virtue infused by God perfecting the higher part of the will [sc. charity], whereby someone more perfectly tends to the good than without it.

133. To the fourth [n.5] I say that the will has two affections [n.110], according to each of which it is possible to reach God immediately - namely according to the elicited affection of justice, tending to God immediately as he is good in himself, and according to the affection of advantage or concupiscence attaining God as he is good for me; and both acts can be ordered and possess a habit inclining to God, and a theological habit because regarding God immediately as object. It is not so on the part of the intellect; for there is only one power there, of a nature to have a second act attaining God (as intelligence); and this power is sufficiently perfected by one habit, which tends to the truth one assents to because of revelation.

134. And from this is plain the answer to the objection about the parts of the image [n.6], because although there are two parts to the image on the part of the intellect and one only on the part of the will, this is not because the intellect attains the object of the will by a double elicited act; for memory, although it have an action of the category of action, yet does not have an action of the category of quality whereby it attains the object; but intelligence alone has an action of the category of quality whereby it attains the object, and this action is an operation about that object. And, to this extent, there is in the intellect the idea of parent, to which belongs action of the category of action, and the idea of product (these two in divine reality represent the Father and the Son); but in the will there is no such idea of originating naturally but only of originating freely - and to the extent the will has the idea of originator, it can be posited as concurring with memory, as was said in 1 d.2 nn.300-303. Briefly then I say that these habits do not correspond to the parts of the image but are only two principles to which belong attaining God immediately by elicited acts; such are the acts of the intellect, which - as it is indistinct - by a single elicited act attains God immediately by believing; but the will, having the ideas of the affection of justice and of advantage, attains God immediately by loving and hoping.

VII. To the Arguments for the Third Way

135. As to the arguments for the opinion [n.27] that posits charity in the concupiscible and hope in the irascible - these arguments are posited to prove a distinction between irascible and concupiscible in the will [nn.28-31] (where perhaps a distinction between them in the will, corresponding to the distinction of the moral virtues perfecting the will [n.39], should be conceded); but the distinction is not needed for the issue at hand.

136. But which of these two virtues are in the will as in the concupiscible?

The way the question is posed it will rather be hope, taking ‘desire’ strictly for ‘desire the advantageous for the desirer’ [nn.40, 58]. Absolutely however both these appetitive theological virtues are in the concupiscible, because the irascible is not of a nature to have God for immediate object, as is touched on by one of the arguments (against this opinion) about being irate [n.38], and it will be touched on below in the material on the moral virtues [d.34 nn.38, 48, 51].a

a.a[Interpolation: a synthesis of the whole question] The opinion that ‘hope is not a virtue distinct from faith or charity’ but either it is them, when it is perfect, or is a kind of faith, is not rejected. The opinion of Henry has four arguments and an addition about force. Proof of Henry’s first argument, as here above     etc .

     Solution: to desire God to be my good, from him as bestowing it on me for my merits, is a good act; therefore      there can be a virtue for it, and a theological one, because taken from the object, which is the first condition. The proof is that it is possible to have thed three conditions theologically, namely to have God as measure and efficient cause, although some virtue could be acquired. This act is not one of faith because it is not a believing; nor is it one of love, for three reasons - that it is for me, that it belongs to the affection for advantage, that it is separable.

     On the contrary: I desire naturally; someone in despair desires. There are two simultaneous acts: I desire from charity. And this is reduced by a likeness to faith, because I believe in him and for myself. Nor is it solved and reduced, because I desire for another.

     About absence, whether it is of the idea of the object and is obscure in respect of faith? For these are always so emptied that the habits are essentially imperfect, or imperfection is concomitant to them; and the like is objected about objects imperfectly.